Charley Patterson, an Individual, Plaintiff/Appellee vs. Jed Knight, and Individual, and Alisha Knight, and Individual, Defendants/Appellants by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
Charley Patterson, an Individual, Plaintiff/Appellee vs. Jed Knight, 
and Individual, and Alisha Knight, and Individual, Defendants/
Appellants 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Article, Patterson v Knight and Knight, No. 20150885 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3488 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. 
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback. 
No. 20150885-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLEY PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JED KNIGHT and ALISHA KNIGHT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
On appeal from the Third Jndicial District Court, Honorable 
James Gardner, District Court No. 140906572 
Erik A. Olson 
MARSHALL OLSON & HULL, P.C. 
Newhouse Building 
Ten Exchange Place, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce R. Baird 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, PLLC 
2150 S. 1300 E. , 5th Floor 
SaltLake City, Utah 84106 
Attornevs for Defendants!Avvellants 
J. Ryan Mitchell (9362) 
MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 1 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 2 7 20\6 
No. 20150885-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLEY PATTERSON, 
Plaint(ff and Appellee, 
v. 
JED KNIGHT and ALISHA KNIGHT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONSE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
On appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable 
James Gardner, District Court No. 140906572 
Erik A. Olson 
MARSHALL OLSON & HULL, P.C. 
Newhouse Building 
Ten Exchange Place, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce R. Baird 
BRUCE R. BAIRD, PLLC 
2150 S. 1300 E., 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appel /ants 
J. Ryan Mitchell (9362) 
MITCHELL BARLOW & MANSFIELD, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
((j 
~ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................. 2 
I. Nature of the Case ...................................................................... 2 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below ..................................... 2 
III. Relevant Facts ......................................................................... 4 
A. The parties agree to combine their Nu Skin distributorships 
and share equally all Nu Skin-related payments ........................... .4 
B. Patterson complies with the JV Agreement, but discovers 
the Knights have been keeping substantial Nu Skin 
commissions in violation of the JV Agreement ............................... 5 
C. Patterson files this lawsuit, the Knights request early mediation, 
and the parties settle their dispute at the mediation .............................. 7 
D. The terms of the Mediation Agreement ........................................ 8 
E. After executing the Mediation Agreement, the Knights 
experience "settlers' remorse" and attempt to back 
out of the settlement. ............................................................ 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................... 13 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 15 
I. 
l I. 
The Knights Have Failed To Carry Their Burden Of Persuasion 
Because They Have Failed To Show That The Trial Court's 
Decision Was Clearly Erroneous ............................................... 15 
The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That The Parties 
Reached A Meeting Of The Minds On The Essential Terms 
Of A Binding Settlement Agreement.. ........................................ 17 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That The 
Additional Agreements Contemplated By The Mediation 
Agreement Were Not Essential, Missing Terms That Precluded 
The Parties From Reaching A Meeting Of The Minds ....................... 20 
1. The trial court did not clearly err in rejecting the Knights' 
argument that a binding settlement was contingent on negotiating 
and executing new Spearhead and G YN agreements .................... 21 
2. Agreement on the specific language and parameters of the 
mutual non-disparagement provision was not an essential 
condition to a binding settlement ........................................... 26 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 30 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Brasherv. Christensen,2016UTApp 100,--P.3d-- ............................... 1, 16,23 
Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101,276 P.3d 1178 .......................................... 20 
Cessna Fin Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978) ............................ 17, 22, 28 
Dillard v. Starcon Int 'I Inc., 483 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2007) .................................. 28 
Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Westwater Farms, LLC, 
2016 UT App. 60, -- P.3d-- ..................................................................... 18 
Hartle v. Hartle, 2012 UT App 312, 289 P .3d 621 ........................................... 15 
Higbee v. Sentry Insurance Co., 253 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 200 I) ........................ 28, 29 
J.J\11 W. v. T.I.Z. (In Re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38,266 P.3d 702 .............. 26 
Lawrence Const. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah 1982) ............................. 21 
LD Ill, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 30 I, 221 P.3d 867 ............... 1, 13, 15, 17, 20 
LeBaron & Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479 
(Utah App. Ct. 1991 ) .............................................................................. 27 
Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2013 WL 1194721 
<i (D. Utah Mar 22, 2013) ........................................................................... 21 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600 ............................................ 17 
Patterson v. Patterson, 201 I UT 68, 266 P .3d 828 ...................................... 25, 26 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366 .................................................... 27 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. Ct. 1993) .......................................... 27 
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.2d 645 ................................................... 16 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, I 64 P.3d 397 ................................................ 27 
Ill 
Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App. 432,269 P.3d 188 ............................................. 1 
Tolbert v. Kelly, 2013 UT App. 149, 305 P.3d 192 ........................................... I 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979) .............. 17 
Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P2d 4 78 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ......................................................................... 17, 21 <i 
Statutes 
Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)U) ..................................................................... 1 
Other Authorities 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2) ................................................... 20 
IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 
78A-4-l 03(2)U) based on the transfer of this appeal from the Utah Supreme Court. 
ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Did the trial court clearly err in finding that the parties reached a 
meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a binding settlement agreement when the 
settlement terms were reached after a full-day mediation, and where the settlement 
terms were put in writing, reviewed by the parties and their counsel, and then signed by 
the parties? 
Standard of Review: A binding settlement agreement exists if the parties reach 
a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement and the terms are 
sufficiently definite so as to be capable of being enforced. See LD Ill, LLC v. BBRD, 
LC, 2009 UT App 301, 1 14, 221 P .3d 867, 871. Whether the "parties had a meeting of 
the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact" that is "review[ ed] 
for clear error [ and] revers[ ed] only where the finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if [the Court] otherwise reach[ es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Id., at ,r 13 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 1 
1 See also Brasher v. Christensen, 2016 UT App I 00, ,I 13, -- P.3d - (whether parties reached 
meeting of the minds on an enforceable contract is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear 
error); Tolbert v. Kel~v, 2013 UT App. 149, ~ 3,305 P.3d 192 ("Whether the parties had a 
meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact which appellate 
courts review for clear error."); Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App. 432, iJ 11, 269 P.3d 188 (same). 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
At bottom, this is a breach of contract case. Plaintiff/ Appellee Charley Paterson 
("Patterson") and Defendants/ Appellants Jed Knight and Alisha Knight (the "Knights") 
entered into a joint-venture agreement to combine their Nu Skin distributorships and 
share equally all amounts received from the distribution of Nu Skin products. [0001-
21.] Patterson upheld his end of the deal. The Knights did not. Instead, the Knights 
retained for themselves significant commissions that were being paid under an 
undisclosed deal with Spearhead, another Nu Skin distributor. [Id.] Under this 
agreement, Spearhead paid the Knights substantial commissions based on the sale of Nu 
Skin products made by the representatives in Paterson's and Knight's combined Nu 
Skin distributorship. [0597.] Despite Patterson's demand, the Knights have refused to 
pay Patterson a dime of the Spearhead payments, which forced Patterson to file this 
action. [0001-21.] 
II. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below 
Patterson filed his Complaint in September 2014, the gravamen of which is his 
claim that the Knights have improperly refused to pay Patterson his fifty-percent share 
of Nu Skin-related payments that the Knights have received from Spearhead. [Id.] The 
Knights denied Patterson's claims and assetied various counterclaims, which Patterson 
denied. [0035-50; 0069-79.] Shortly after all pleadings had been filed, the Knights 
requested that the parties engage in early mediation to try to resolve their dispute. 
[O 195.] On February 4, 2015, the parties engaged in a formal mediation with the 
2 
• 
Honorable Frank G. Noel (retired). [0247-48.] After several hours of mediation, the 
parties reached an agreement to fully settle their dispute and end the litigation. [Id.] The 
parties' agreement was reduced to writing, reviewed by the parties and their respective 
legal counsel, and then executed (the "Mediation Agreement"). [Id.; Addendum B 
("Add. B"), at 0251-53, which is attached to Appellants' Brief.] 
The Mediation Agreement provides, among other things, that the Knights will 
split all Spearhead commissions with Patterson "50/50"; that the Knights will pay 
Patterson $125,000, plus his attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action; and that the 
parties will modify the way they share certain commissions and operate certain aspects 
of their Nu Skin distributorship. [Add. B, at 0251.] The parties also agreed that these 
terms, which were memorialized in the handwritten Mediation Agreement, would be 
transferred into more formal documents and the action would be dismissed with 
prejudice. [Id., at 253.] About a week after the mediation, and as contemplated by the 
Mediation Agreement, Patterson's counsel sent the Knights' counsel drafts of the 
agreements that set forth more formally the terms agreed to in the Mediation 
Agreement. [0176-77; 0192; 0199-235.] After sitting on the more formal agreements 
for nearly three weeks, the Knights' counsel informed Patterson's counsel-without 
any explanation-that the Knights were refusing to sign the more formal documents, 
and were purporting to terminate the Mediation Agreement. [0236-44.] 
Patterson then filed a motion asking the trial court to enforce the parties' 
settlement that had been reached at mediation. [0 167-88.] After extensive briefing and a 
two-hour hearing, the trial court granted in part Patterson's motion. [Addendum A 
3 
("Add. A"), at 0552-0553, which is attached to Appellants' Brief.] The trial court found 
that "[a]t the conclusion of a lengthy mediation, the parties reached a meeting of the 
minds on the essential terms of an agreement, it was put into writing, reviewed by the 
parties and their counsel, and it was signed." [Id.] The trial court therefore 
"conclude[ed] that the [Mediation] Agreement was an enforceable and binding 
agreement that should be enforced," and dismissed the action with prejudice. [Id. at 
0552, 0557.] 
III. Relevant Facts 
A. The parties agree to combine their Nu Skin distributorships and share equally 
all Nu Skin related payments. 
1. Patterson and the Knights are distributors for Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc., a 
direct sales company that markets personal care, beauty, nutrition, and technology 
products through its network of worldwide distributors. [0 173; 0001-0016.] 
2. Patterson and the Knights each had built a team of Nu Skin distributors, 
commonly referred to as a "downline." [Id.] Patterson and the Knights received 
commissions for their own personal sales of Nu Skin products as well as commissions 
for the sale of Nu Skin products made by individuals in their respective downlines. [Id.] 
3. In September 2004, Patterson and the Knights agreed to combine their 
Nu Skin distributorships and to share equally all amounts received from the distribution 
4 
of Nu Skin products. To memorialize this agreement, the parties entered into a written 
joint-venture agreement (the "JV Agreement").2 [Id.; 0018-0021.] 
4. The JV Agreement provided, among other things, that all amounts 
received by the parties related to the distribution of Nu Skin products would be shared 
equally: 
Division of Receipts. All amounts received by Knight and Patterson ( or 
Zeros Inc.) with respect to distribution of Nu Skin products for the September, 
2004 commission period forward shall be divided equally between Knight, Fry 
and Patterson. All receipts, whether from product sales by the parties or 
commissions on product sales by the parties' front line distributors, shall be 
subject to the terms of this Agreement. Each party may direct that his share of 
receipts be paid to a corporation owned by such party. 
[0018, at 12.] 
5. To ensure that the parties would not skirt their obligation to share all Nu 
Skin- related payments equally, the JV Agreement included an "Exclusivity" provision 
providing that "[n]o party will create any Nu Skin distributorships that are not subject 
to the terms of this Agreement." [0019, at iJ 5.] 
B. Patterson complies with the JV Agreement, but discovers the Knights have been 
keeping substantial Nu Skin commissions in violation of the JV Agreement. 
6. To manage and administer the operations of the parties' combined Nu 
Skin distributorships, Patterson and the Knights formed, and are the sole shareholders 
2 The JV Agreement was originally entered into by Patterson, Jed Knight, and Ryan 
Fry. [00 I 8-0020.] In approximately February 2007, however, Patterson and Jed Knight 
purchased Mr. Fry's interest in the joint venture and Mr. Fry ceased any involvement 
with the combined Nu Skin distributorship. [0004, at iJ 22.] At about this same time, 
Patterson, Jed Knight, and Alisha Knight executed a February 17, 2007, Supplemental 
Agreement that provided for Alisha to receive a portion of the Nu Skin payments that 
Jed Knight was entitled to receive under the JV Agreement. [Id., at il 23; 0173, at ii 5.] 
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of, a company named Got Your Number, Inc. ("GYN") [0366, at n. 2; 0574, at 0583, 
0596-97, 0625-26.] The parties have operated their combined Nu Skin distributorship 
through GYN. [Id.] 
7. After the JV Agreement was executed, Patterson complied with its terms 
and shared fifty percent of all Nu Skin related payments with the Knights. [0005, at 1 
26; 0008, at if 48.] 
8. Based on the JV Agreement's provisions, as well as representations made 
by the Knights, Patterson believed he was receiving fifty-percent of all the Nu Skin 
related payments that the Knights were receiving. [0003-0016; 0174, at ~6.] 
9. Patterson discovered, however, that the Knights for years had been 
receiving Nu Skin-related payments that they were not sharing with Patterson. [Id., at~ 
7.] Specifically, the Knights were receiving substantial commissions under an 
agreement with another Nu Skin distributor group named Spearhead, whereby 
Spearhead paid the Knights commissions based on the volume of Nu Skin products sold 
by Patterson's and the Knights' combined distributorship. [0007, at 1137-40; 0174, at 
~~ 7-8.] 
I 0. From September 2004 through the present, the Knights have not paid 
Patterson any portion of the Spearhead payments, even though his Nu Skin downline is 
largely responsible for the commissions the Knights have been paid. [Id., at ,I 7.] 
11. After discovering that the Knights had failed to share the Spearhead 
payments as required by the JV Agreement, Patterson demanded that the Knights 
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comply with the JV Agreement's terms and account to him for all amounts they had 
received from Spearhead. [Id., at ~il 7-8.] The Knights refused. [Id.] 
C. Patterson files this lawsuit, the Knights request early mediation, and the 
parties settle their dispute at the mediation. 
12. On September 22, 2014, Patterson filed this action, the gravamen of 
which is Patterson's claim that he is entitled to fifty percent of all future Spearhead 
payments and an accounting and payment for his fifty-percent share of all past 
Spearhead payments since September 2004. [0001-0021; 017 4, at if 9.] 
13. Less than two months after this action was filed, the Knights wanted to 
mediate, stating "they were certainly open to making a good faith effort to resolve the 
matter with the assistance of a mediator." [O 195.] 
14. Based on the Knights' request and representation that they would mediate 
in good faith, Patterson agreed to early mediation. Accordingly, on February 4, 2015, 
the parties held a full-day mediation with retired Judge Frank G. Noel. [0175, at ,r 13; 
0247, at ,r,r 3-5.] 
15. After several hours of negotiations, Patterson and the Knights reached an 
agreement to resolve their disputes and settle the lawsuit. [0175, at if 16; 0247, at if,r 6-
8.] 
16. The terms of the parties' settlement agreement were set forth in a 
handwritten document prepared by Patterson's counsel. [0 175, at if1 17-18; 0248, at ir 
9.] 
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17. The Knights and their counsel reviewed the handwritten agreement and 
proposed certain changes. Patterson agreed to the Knights' changes, which were then 
added to the handwritten agreement. [0175, at 1~ 18-19; 0248, at ,ir 9-11.] 
18. After the Knights' requested changes were made and agreed to, each of 
the parties executed the handwritten agreement (the "Mediation Agreement"). [Id.] 
19. Once the Mediation Agreement was signed, no one expressed any belief 
that there were any unresolved material issues or that the settlement was contingent on 
the drafting of more formal documents. [0248, at 1 14.] 
D. The terms of the Mediation Agreement. 
20. The Mediation Agreement contains nine provisions. [See Addendum B, 
("Add. B."), which is attached to Appellants' Brief.] 
21. Provisions one through seven contain the material terms of the parties' 
settlement that resolve the dispute over past and future Spearhead payments; modify 
how certain GYN commissions will be shared and how certain GYN expenses and 
responsibilities will be managed; and provide that the Knights will pay Patterson the 
attorneys' fees he was forced to incur in bringing this action. [ Add. B, at ~,r 1-7.] 
22. Specifically, provisions one through seven provide: 
1. Beginning Jan 2015 commissions Spearhead going forward 50/50 
split. New Agreement [ with] Spearhead/Nathan. 
2. Jed & Alisha pay Charley $125,000, payable at $1,000 per month 
for 1 0½ years or until fully paid. Payment made by 25 th day of each 
month. No interest. Failure to pay by 25 th then interest [at] 12%. If 
payment default lasts 60 days then entire amount is due and owing. 
8 
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23. 
3. New legs 100% of BB Account or BBB Account goes to 
individual who builds the line. The GYN portion of commission split 
50/50. 
4. Current GYN lines split 50/50. 
5. Jed and Alisha resp[onsible] for maintaining min[imum] parent 
and seven Executives, [and] Charley resp[ onsible] for maintaining 
min[imum] 8 Executives. Failure to maintain results in I 00% of 
commissions going to party who maintains. 
6. Expenses for business paid before commissions. Expenses are for 
reasonable air, hotel, rental car ( ex. airfare booked at least 2 weeks [in] 
advance, economy seating. Hotel economy level lodging, economy rental 
car) Any expenses over $2,500 will be discussed between the parties. 
7. Charley's Atty Fees paid by Jed & Alisha paid 12 months. 
Charley will provide accounting. Approx. $40k est. 
7. Cont. - Attorney fees shall be paid at $1,000 per month over 35-40 
months, as provided in point 2. In other words, total amount due for fees 
& past is 155-165 paid at $1,000 per month over approx. 15 yrs. 
Provisions eight and nine, by contrast, contain the procedural mechanism 
for putting the Mediation Agreement's material terms in more formal documents and 
dismissing this action with prejudice: 
8. Subject to drafting mutually acceptable settlement agreement 
[with] above provisions and mutual non-disparagement, and new GYN 
[and] Spearhead agreements. 
9. Upon execution of final settlement documents and new GYN and 
new Spear head [agreements] Parties will file a stipulated motion and 
order to dismiss the litigation [with] prejudice. 
[Add. B, at~~ 8-9.] 
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E. After executing the Mediation Agreement, the Knights experience "settlers' 
remorse" and attempt to back out of the settlement. 
24. As contemplated, the more formal documents incorporating the Mediation 
Agreement's terms were drafted and provided to the Knights' counsel on February 12, 
2015, about one week after the mediation. [0 176-77, at ~122-26; 0192, at 1~ 5-8; 0199-
0235.] 
25. About a week later, on February 18, 2015, Patterson's counsel emailed 
the Knights' counsel asking for an update on whether the Knights had reviewed the 
more formal agreements that were sent on February 12. [0236.] 
26. The Knights' counsel responded the same day stating the Knights had the 
documents and he "will put a 'bug in their ear' to get with it." [0238.] 
2 7. After nearly two more weeks passed without any response from the 
Knights, Patterson's counsel again emailed the Knights' counsel on March 2, 2015, 
seeking an update and expressing Patterson's concern with the Knights' delay. [0240.] 
Later that evening, the Knights' counsel responded with the following email purporting 
to terminate the Mediation Agreement without any explanation or reason. [0242.] 
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Subject: RE: Charley Patterson v. Jed & Alisha Knight 
Date: Monday, March 2, 2015 at 7:54:29 PM Mountain Standard Time 
From: B. Ray Zoll 
To: J. Ryan Mitchell, jon 
CC: Ruby Redshaw 
ryan: 
Unfortunately I have been advised by my clients that they cannot agree to the terms as drafted and 
they will be terminating the mediation proposed agreement that was subject to an agreeable final 
agreement. 
Please note that I do not believe it is legal for Jed and Alisha's moneys to be unilaterally withheld in a 
fictitious escrow account. 
I will be bringing in the litigation team in my stead next week after they enter into the necessary 
engagement letters with Jed and Alisha. 
It is unfortunate that the mediation failed but know they are prepared to litigate for what they deem 
only fair and Sandie Tillotson has entered her support for her daughter. 
I will have the entry of appearance with new council submitted to you as soon as I get it. 
Best regards, 
Ray 
28. Patterson's counsel responded later that night, informing the Knights' 
counsel that Patterson believed the Mediation Agreement was binding and requesting 
an explanation as to why the Knights were purporting terminate the Mediation 
Agreement. [0244.] 
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Subject: Re: Charley Patterson v. Jed & Alisha Knight 
Date: Monday, March 2, 2015 at 11:35:22 PM Mountain Standard Time 
From: J. Ryan Mitchell 
To: B. Ray Zoll, jon 
CC: Ruby Redshaw 
Ray, 
As I'm sure you can understand, I am extremely surprised by your clients' attempt to reject the agreement our clients 
reached during last month's mediation. It's particularly troubling considering your clients are simply saying "they 
cannot agree to the terms as drafted" without identifying the specific terms with which they disagree or providing 
any proposed revisions that would alleviate their purported concerns. Please let me know as soon as possible which 
specific terms are unacceptable and why. To be clear, we believe the agreement reached by the parties during 
mediation is legally binding. Nevertheless, we would prefer to avoid the time and expense involved in asking the 
court to enforce the agreement, and would rather try to understand and resolve your clients' concerns with the 
agreements if possible. Thus, please let me know by tomorrow what specific terms are unacceptable and the 
reason(s) why, and whether your clients would like to attempt to resolve such issues or whether they will be 
maintaining their position that the agreement reached during mediation is terminated. 
Best Regards, 
Ryan 
mi MITC:HELL BARl.l)\Y/& M /\ \:S Fl ELD 
J. Ryan Mitchell 
Mitchell Barlow & Mansfield, P.C. 
Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ph: (801) 998-8888 
fax: {801) 998-8077 
rrnitchell@mbrnlawyers.com 
www.mbmlawyers.com 
29. The Knights' counsel never responded to Patterson's counsel's email. 
[0191, at 0193, iJ 14.] 
30. Accordingly, Patterson filed a motion asking the trial court to enforce the 
parties' settlement that had been reached at mediation. [0 167-170.] The trial court 
granted Patterson's motion in part, finding that " [a] t the conclusion of a lengthy 
mediation, the parties reached a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an 
agreement, it was put into writing, reviewed by the parties and their counsel, and it was 
signed." The Cow1 therefore concluded that the Mediation Agreement "is an 
12 
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enforceable and binding agreement that should be enforced," and dismissed the action 
with prejudice. [Add. A, at 0550, 0552-53, 0557.]3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the trial court's September 17, 2015 Order for three 
reasons. First, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because the Knights have 
failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the trial court clearly erred in finding 
the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract. Rather 
than marshaling the evidence and attempting to show that trial court's finding was 
against the clear weight of all the evidence, the Knights incorrectly argue that the trial 
court's finding is a legal question that is reviewed for correctness, and that as a matter 
of law the trial court erred in finding the parties reached a meeting of the minds on a 
settlement. [Brief of Appellants ("App. Br."), at pp. 1, 9.] Utah law is well settled, 
however, that whether "parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding 
contract is an issue of fact" that is "review[ ed] for clear error [ and] revers[ ed] only 
where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the Court] otherwise 
reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." LD III, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 
2009 UT App 301, if 13, 221 P .3d 867, 871 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Because the Knights have not even attempted to marshal the evidence or to demonstrate 
that the trial court's finding was "against the clear weight of the evidence," the Knights 
have failed to meet their burden of persuasion and their appeal should be denied. 
3 Patterson also asked the trial court to enforce the more formal agreements that had 
been drafted, but the trial court declined this request. [App. A, at 0557.] 
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Second, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because it did not err-and 
certainly did not clearly err-in finding that the parties reached a meeting of the minds 
on the essential terms of a settlement, and that the settlement terms were sufficiently 
definite to be enforced. The settlement terms were agreed to at the end of a lengthy 
mediation, where each party was represented by counsel and assisted by an experienced 
mediator. After the parties reached agreement on the terms of their settlement, the terms 
were put into writing, reviewed by the parties and their counsel, and then signed by the 
parties. The Mediation Agreement's terms are sufficiently definite so as to be capable 
of being enforced because a court could determine whether the terms were breached 
and could fashion an appropriate remedy if a breach occurs. 
Third, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because it did not clearly err by 
rejecting the Knights' argument that the more formal documents contemplated by the 
Mediation Agreement or the specific parameters of a mutual non-disparagement 
provision were essential, missing terms that precluded the parties from reaching a 
meeting of the minds on a binding settlement. After considering the entire Mediation 
Agreement and the circumstances under which it was entered, the trial court correctly 
found that although the Mediation Agreement contained a provision providing that 
more formal documents would be drafted, this provision "does not contemplate further 
negotiations over material terms, but instead contemplates ( 1) that the parties will take 
the handwritten [Mediation] Agreement and formalize it in a written format; and (2) 
[the] parties will amend existing agreements to_ include the provisions set forth in the 
[Mediation] Agreement." [Add. A, at 0553.] As the trial court recognized, the practice 
14 
• 
• 
of drafting more formal documents that incorporate the terms of an agreed settlement 
"is common place in settlements that take place at mediation," and such a provision 
does not effect the enforceability of such a settlement agreement under Utah law. [Id., 
at 0553-54 ( citations omitted).] 
For all these reasons, as discussed more fully below, the Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Knights Have Failed To Carry Their Burden Of Persuasion Because 
They Have Failed To Show That The Trial Court's Decision Was Clearly 
Erroneous. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's finding that the parties reached a 
meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an enforceable settlement agreement is 
reversible error. [App. Br. at 1, 8-9.] The Knights' claim whether there was a meeting of the 
minds between parties is a question of law reviewed for correctness. [Id.] The Knights are 
wrong. Utah law is well established that "whether the parties had a meeting of the minds 
sufficient to create a binding contract is an issue of fact [that the Court] will review for clear 
error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
court otherwise reaches a firm conviction that a mis take has been made." LD Ill, LLC, 2009 
UT App 301, at iJ 13. 
To reverse the trial court's finding under the clear error standard, the Knights therefore 
"must first marshal all the evidence in support of the [trial court's] finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing 
it in a light most favorable to the trial court." Hartle v. Hartle, 2012 UT App 312, ii 2, 289 
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P .3d 621, 623 ( citations omitted). In marshaling the evidence, the Knights cannot simply 
present the facts and excerpts from the record that suppo1i their argument, but instead must 
present the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court. Id., at 13. Put differently, 
"[i]n marshaling the evidence, it is an appellant's burden to 'establish[] a basis for overcoming 
the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings." Brasher v. Christensen, 2016 UT App 
100, ,r 24, -- P .3d -- ( quoting State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 11 41, 326 P .2d 645, 653 ). A party 
who fails to marshal the evidence and who fails to identify and deal with evidence supporting 
a trial court's factual findings "will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on 
appeal .... " State V. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, at ,r, 40-42. 
The Knights have failed to carry their burden of persuasion here because they have not 
even attempted to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding or attempted to 
show that the trial court's finding was against the clear weight of the evidence. Rather, the 
Knights ignore most of the Mediation Agreement's terms as well as the facts and 
circumstances surrounding its execution, and myopically focus only on a few select snippets 
from the Mediation Agreement to sweepingly assert that because the Mediation Agreement 
contemplated drafting additional agreements, the trial court's finding that a meeting of the 
minds had been reached was error "as a matter of law." (Appellants' Br. at 8-20.] The Knights' 
conclusory assertions, however, fall woefully short of carrying their burden of marshaling the 
evidence and "establishing a basis for overcoming the healthy does of deference owed to the 
factual findings." Brasher, 2016 UT App 100, at 1 24. Because the Knights have failed to 
carry their burden of persuasion on appeal-by failing to marshal all the evidence and then 
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demonstrating that the trial com1's finding was against the clear weight of the evidence-the 
a trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That The Parties Reached 
A Meeting Of The Minds On The Essential Terms Of A Binding Settlement 
Agreement. 
Utah law favors voluntary settlement of legal disputes. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) (stating that "settlements are favored in the law, 
and should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but 
also to the judicial system."). To further Utah's policy favoring settlement, courts should 
enforce a settlement agreement if the "record establishes a binding agreement and the excuse 
<t for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial." Zions First Nat'/ Bank v. Barbara Jensen 
Interiors, Inc., 78 I P .2d 4 78, 4 79 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ( internal citations and quotations 
omitted). To determine whether a binding settlement agreement exists, courts employ the 
basic rules of contract formation. See LD III, 2009 UT App 30 I, at~ 14. An enforceable 
contract exists if the parties reach a meeting of the minds on the essential or material terms of 
the agreement and the terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of being enforced. Id. 
Whether a term is essential or material to a contract "requires an examination of the entire 
agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into." Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37,, 13, 78 P.3d 600, 602 (quoting Cessna Fin C01p. v. Meyer, 575 
P .2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978) ). Importantly, a settlement agreement may be enforced even 
though some terms may be missing or left to be agreed upon. See Id., at ir 12 (stating H[a] 
contract may be enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left to be agreed 
upon, but if the essential terms are so unce11ain that there is no basis for deciding whether the 
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agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract.") ( citations and internal quotations 
omitted); Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Westwater Farms, LLC, 2016 UT App. 60, 1 11, --
P.3d --. 
Based on an examination of all the Mediation Agreement's terms and the circumstances 
under which it was entered, the trial court did not err-and certainly did not clearly err-in 
finding that the parties reached a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a settlement. 
The record before the trial court established that in 2004, the parties entered into the JV 
Agreement whereby they agreed to combine their Nu Skin distributorships and to share 
equally all Nu Skin-related revenue. [Fact 3.]4 Despite this agreement, the Knights failed to 
share with Patterson significant Nu Skin revenue they were receiving under an undisclosed 
agreement with Spearhead, another Nu Skin distributor. [Id., at 9-1 0.] After Patterson 
discovered the Knights' agreement with Spearhead, Patterson demanded that the Knights share 
all Spearhead commissions equally as required by the JV Agreement. [Id., at 11.] The Knights 
refused. [Id.] 
Patterson then filed this action, the gravamen of which seeks damages for his fifty-
percent share of the Spearhead commissions the Knights wrongfully withheld and a judgment 
declaring that the Knights must pay Patterson fifty percent of all future Spearhead 
commissions. [Id., at 12.] Shortly after this action was filed, the Knights proposed early 
mediation and represented they would "make[] a good faith effort to resolve the matter with 
the assistance of a mediator." [Id., at 13.] The parties then held a full-day mediation with 
retired Judge Frank G. Noel. At the mediation, the parties, who were each represented by legal 
4 Citations to the Relevant Facts section of this brief are cited as [Fact 3.] 
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counsel, spent the day working with Judge Noel to reach a settlement of their disputes. [Id., at 
8 14] After several hours of negotiations, the parties reached an agreement to settle their 
disputes. [Id., at 15.] The parties' agreement was put in writing, reviewed by the parties and 
their counsel, and signed. [Id., at 16-18.] After signing the Mediation Agreement, no one 
stated or suggested that it was not a binding settlement, or that these terms were simply 
negotiating points for further discussion. [Id., at 19.] 
The Mediation Agreement contained the essential terms of the parties' settlement: it 
provided that the Knights would split all future Spearhead commissions with Patterson 
"50/50"; that the Knights would pay Patterson $125,000 ( under certain payment terms) to 
settle his claim to past Spearhead commissions; that the Knights would pay Patterson the 
attorneys' fees he incurred in bringing this action; and modified the way in which the parties 
operated GYN, the entity that managed their Nu Skin distributorship, including how certain 
commissions would be shared and how certain expenses would be handled. [Id., at 20-23.] 
Shortly after the Mediation Agreement was executed, Patterson's counsel provided the 
Knights' counsel with the more formal agreements that incorporated these terms from the 
Mediation Agreement. [Id., at 24.] The Knights, however, never communicated with Patterson 
or his counsel regarding these more formal agreements, but simply sat on them for nearly a 
month before purporting to terminate the parties' settlement without warning or explanation. 
[Id., at 25-29.] 
Based on this record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that all of the essential 
elements of a contract were present: there was an offer, acceptance, consideration, and a 
meeting of the minds on the essential elements of their agreement. Moreover, the Mediation 
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Agreement's essential terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of being enforced 
because they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an 
appropriate remedy. See LD 111, LLC, 2009 UT App 301, at iJ 14; Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT 
App 101, ,r 24,276 P.3d 1178 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 33(2)). For 
example, paragraph 1, which requires that all future Spearhead commissions be split between 
the parties 50/50 is sufficiently definite because a court could determine whether the provision 
has been breached ( e.g., the Knights fail to pay Patterson his fifty-percent share of the 
commissions) and an appropriate remedy for this breach ( e.g., an judgment awarding Patterson 
his share, and an order requiring the Knights to pay Patterson his share of all future 
commissions). Similarly, paragraph 2 is plainly enforceable because it simply requires the 
Knights to pay Patterson $125,000 under certain payment terms. If the Knights fail to pay 
Patterson this amount-which they indisputably have failed to pay-the court can fashion the 
appropriate remedy. The remaining essential terms (paragraphs 3-7) also fit the bill and are 
sufficiently definite because they are capable of being enforced. Accordingly, the trial comt's 
ruling was supported by the factual record and was not a clear error. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Finding That The Additional 
Agreements Contemplated By The Mediation Agreement Were Not Essential, 
Missing Terms That Precluded The Parties From Reaching A Meeting Of The 
Minds. 
The Knights' appeal rests entirely on the assertion that the parties could not have 
reached a meeting of the minds on a binding settlement because "[a]ny settlement was subject 
to the negotiation and execution of further agreements, which never happened." [Appellants' 
Br. at I 2.] Specifically, the Knights claim any binding settlement was contingent on first 
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negotiating and signing new agreements with Spearhead and GYN, and agreeing upon the 
fii specific language and parameters of a mutual non-disparagement provision. [Id., at pp. 8-20.] 
The Knights' argument misses the mark, however, because it misconstrues the Mediation 
Agreement's terms and ignores the substantial evidence that supported the trial court's 
findings and decision. 
1. The trial court did not clearly err in rejecting the Knights' argument that a 
binding settlement was contingent on negotiating and executing new 
Spearhead and GYN agreements. 
The Knights argue that the Mediation Agreement was not a binding agreement because 
it was "subject to the negotiation and execution" of an amended Spearhead agreement, which 
<j never happened. [App. Br., p. 12.] But after considering the entire Mediation Agreement and 
the circumstances surrounding its execution, the trial court rejected this argument, finding the 
Mediation Agreement's provisions " ... do[ ] not contemplate further negotiations over 
material terms, but instead contemplates (I) that the parties will take the handwritten 
[Mediation] Agreement and formalize it in a written format; and (2) the parties will amend 
existing agreements to include the provisions set forth in the [Mediation] Agreement." [App. 
A, at 0553.] The trial court found that such a process was "common place in settlements that 
take place at mediation," and that settlements are "enforceable even when the parties expect to 
put the terms in a more formal document." [Id., at 0553-54, citing Lawrence Const. Co. v. 
Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982); Zions First Nat. Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
Inc., 781 P2d 4 78, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, 2:07-CV-871 TS, 
20 I 3 WL 1194721, *2 (D. Utah Mar 22, 2013) appeal dismissed, 750 F.3d 1173 ( I 0th Cir. 
2014 ). ] Moreover, the trial court found that the essential term of the parties' settlement was 
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their agreement to split future Spearhead commissions 50/50, and that "whether those proceeds 
came directly from Spearhead through an amended agreement or from [the Knights] is not the 
material issue." [Id., at 0553 n.3.] 
On appeal, the Knights claim the trial court's findings were incorrect as a matter of law, 
but again they fail to marshal the evidence and then demonstrate that the trial court's findings 
were clear error. Instead, they simply make the sweeping conclusion that a new Spearhead 
agreement must have been an essential term of any settlement as a matter of law because 
"[h]ad the new Spearhead agreement not been an essential, material settlement term, it would 
not have been required in paragraphs, 1, 8, and 9 of the Mediation Agreement .... " Such 
conclusory assertions, however, do not demonstrate that the trial court committed clear error. 5 
And these improper conclusions aside, the record evidence amply supports the trial court's 
finding that the essential settlement term was the paiiies' agreement to split future Spearhead 
payments equally, not the negotiation-or renegotiation-of an entirely new Spearhead 
5 The Knights also argue the trial court's finding was in err or because "[t]here is 
nothing in the Mediation Agreement itself to suggest that Patterson merely wanted-
whatever the source-a 50-50 split of [the Spearhead] commissions .... " [App. Br., at 
pp. 13-14.] But as the Knights themselves recognize, in determining whether a term is 
essential to a binding settlement, the trial court is not limited solely to four corners of 
the Mediation Agreement, but instead must "exam in[ e] the entire agreement and the 
circumstances under which the agreement was entered into." [ App. Br., at p. 12 citing 
Cessna Fin Corp. v. A1eyer, 575 P.2d I 048, 1050 (Utah 1978)). And that is exactly what 
the trial court did here-it examined the entire Mediation Agreement and the 
circumstances under which it was entered before finding the material term of the 
settlement was an agreement to split future Spearhead commissions 50/50, and that 
whether those payments were made by Spearhead or the Knights was not a material 
issue. [Add. A, at 0553 n.3.] 
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Agreement. 6 First, the crux of this entire action is Patterson's claim that the Knights breached 
€i the parties' JV Agreement by failing to pay Patterson his fifty-percent share of the Spearhead 
commissions. [Fact 12.] No other issue related to Spearhead or the existing Spearhead 
agreement was relevant to Patterson's claims . 
• Second, the Mediation Agreement's material terms relate only to the payment of past 
and future Spearhead commissions. There is no discussion-or even mention-of any of the 
other terms of the Spearhead agreement or amending any of its other material terms. It stands 
to reason that if the parties had agreed to make other changes or amendments to any of the 
existing agreements, that at a minimum, those purported changes would have at least been 
• mentioned in the Mediation Agreement. Relatedly, and despite the Knights' repeated 
assertions, the Mediation Agreement does not state that the parties would negotiate new 
Spearhead terms. [ See App. Br., pp. 12, 14, 15.] Instead, the Mediation Agreement 
contemplates that more formal agreements incorporating the Mediation Agreement's terms 
would be drafted. [See Add. B., at 0253 ~ 8.] And this is exactly what happened: shortly after 
the mediation concluded, the more formal agreements, including an amended Spearhead 
Agreement, were drafted and provided to the Knights. [Facts 24-29.] These more formal 
agreements-including the amended Spearhead Agreement-incorporated the terms agreed to 
6 Importantly, however, it is not Patterson's burden to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings; it is the Knights' burden to marshal the evidence and then 
"establish a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual 
findings" to show that the finding was against the clear weight of the evidence. See 
Brasher, 2016 UT App 100, 124 ( quoting Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, at ~ 41 ). The Knights 
have failed to satisfy their burden, relying instead on only a few handpicked facts that 
they believe support their claim. Such a tactic is improper. 
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by the parties in the Mediation Agreement. [0221-34, 0585-86, 0598, 0635, 0665-67, 0674-
77.] 
To convince the Court that the amended Spearhead Agreement must have been an 
essential, missing settlement term, the Knights assert "the task at hand was not as simple as 
formalizing the single term of the new Spearhead agreement referenced in the Mediation 
Agreement ... [because] the proposed new Spearhead agreement is 14-pages long, involves 
unique contractual terms specific to entities in a multi-level marketing company, and contains 
language not found in the original Spearhead agreement or the Mediation Agreement." [App. 
Br., at p. 16.] But what the Knights fail to mention is that the new proposed Spearhead 
agreement is virtually identical to the Spearhead agreement that Jed Knight signed and under 
which the Knights had been operating and receiving substantial commissions for more than a 
decade. [0585-86, 0598, 0635, 0665-67, 0674-77.] The only material difference between the 
proposed new Spearhead agreement and the existing Spearhead agreement is that the new 
version incorporates the terms of the Mediation Agreement: it adds all the parties to the 
agreement and provides for the Knights to receive fifty-percent of future commissions and for 
Patterson to receive fifty-percent of the future commissions. [Id.] These changes are exactly 
what the parties agreed to at the mediation-they agreed to split all Spearhead commissions 
with Patterson "50/50" and to draft a new Spearhead agreement to reflect the fact that the 
Knights and Patterson were each entitled to receive the Spearhead payments. 
Even though the Knights neglect to mention this in their brief, the trial court was well 
aware of the fact that the proposed new Spearhead agreement and existing Spearhead 
agreement were virtually identical other than including the Knights and Patterson as parties, 
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and providing for the 50/50 split of all future payments. [Jd.]7 Accordingly, the trial court did 
not clearly err in finding that the essential term of the parties' settlement was the 50/50 split of 
future Spearhead commissions and that an amended Spearhead agreement was not a material 
term, but merely a mechanism to facilitate Patterson receiving his payments directly from 
Spearhead instead of from the Knights. 
In a single paragraph, the Knights argue that for reasons similar to their argument 
concerning the Spearhead agreement, "the negotiation, creation, and execution of a new 'GYN 
agreement' was an essential term of any final settlement, as specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 of 
the Mediation Agreement," and that the trial court "erred in concluding" otherwise. [App. Br., 
• pp. 19-20.] For all the reasons above, the Knights' argument is without merit and should be 
rejected out of hand. First, the Knights have failed to demonstrate clear error by the trial court. 
Second, the trial court did not commit any error, and certainly not clear error. Like the 
proposed new Spearhead agreement, the purpose of the new GYN agreement was simply to 
take the material terms that had been agreed to in the Mediation Agreement and incorporate 
them into a more formalized agreement. That is what occurred. [See 0311-19, 0251-53.] As the 
trial court recognized, the process of taking a handwritten agreement made at mediation and 
formalizing its terms in a subsequent written agreement "is common place in settlements that 
take place at mediation." [App. A at 554.] The purpose of the further agreements was not, as 
• 
7 The Knights argue that the new proposed Spearhead agreement shows no meeting of 
the minds because it would obligate Alisha Knight to comply with certain restrictive 
covenants to which she had not previously been subject. The Knights, however, never 
raised this argument before the trial court, and thus have failed to preserve this issue for 
appeal. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, if 12, 266 P.3d 828, 831-32 (stating 
that Utah appellate courts with generally not consider an issue or argument unless it 
was first raised before the trial court). 
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the Knights argue, to serve as some sort of starting place or springboard for future negotiation 
of proposals or topics that were never discussed-and ce1iainly never agreed to-during the 
mediation. Accordingly, because the Knights have failed to demonstrate that the trial court's 
decision finding that neither the Spearhead agreement or GYN agreement to be essential, 
missing terms of a binding contract was clear error, the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
2. Agreement on the specific language and parameters of the mutual non-
disparagement provision was not an essential condition to a binding settlement. 
Finally, the Knights argue the Mediation Agreement is unenforceable because the 
parties never reached a meeting of the minds on the specific language of the non-
disparagement clause referenced in paragraph 8. [App. Br., at pp. 17-19.] This claim fails for 
at least two reasons: first, the Knights failed to properly raise this issue before the trial court 
and thus have not preserved it for appeal; second, the evidence shows the specific language or 
parameters of a non-disparagement clause was not an essential condition precedent to an 
enforceable settlement, and the Knights have failed to caITy their burden to prove otherwise. 
Utah appellate courts "generally will not consider an issue unless it has been preserved 
for appeal." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,112,266 P.3d 828, 831-32 (citing J.M W. v. 
TI.Z. (In Re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, 125, 266 P.3d 702). To preserve an issue 
for appeal, an appellant must have presented the issue to the trial court in such a way that it 
had a sufficient opportunity to rule on the issue. Id. The Knights failed to preserve the issue of 
whether the specific language and parameters of a mutual non-disparagement clause was an 
essential settlement term because they failed to sufficiently present this argument to the trial 
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court. In fact, the only time this issue was referenced during the trial court proceedings was by 
~ way of two conclusory sentences in the Knights' opposition to Patterson's motion to enforce 
the settlement. The Knights' opposition argued that because the Mediation Agreement was 
subject to drafting further agreements and " ... no specific terms are discussed as to what the 
non-disparagement, GYN, and Spearhead agreements will contain," the Mediation Agreement 
is a non-binding proposal. [0365.] Such a fleeting reference without any further explanation, 
analysis, or supporting evidence is insufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the 
specific parameters of the mutual non-disparagement provision was an essential settlement 
term. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ~ 15, 164 P.3d 366, 372-73 (stating that party fails to 
@ preserve an issue for appeal if at the trial court level the party "merely mention[s] [the] issue 
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.")8 
Even if the Knights had preserved this issue for appeal, they have failed to present any 
evidence showing that the specific parameters of the non-disparagement clause were an 
essential term to the parties' settlement. The Knights, in fact, have not even attempted to 
adduce any facts or evidence showing that the non-disparagement provision's specific 
parameters were essential to the parties' settlement. Nor could they. Other than the fleeting 
reference cited above, the Knights never argued to the trial court that the non-disparagement 
provision's language or parameters were essential to any agreement-not in their sworn 
8 See also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 1 16, 164 P.3d 397, 404 (stating "that 
perfunctorily mentioning an issue, without more, does not preserve it for appeal); State 
v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. Ct. 1993) ("[t]he 'mere mention' ofan issue 
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve 
that issue for appeal," quoting LeBaron & Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 
P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. Ct. 1991 ). 
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Declarations, briefing, or during the two-hour hearing on Patterson's motion to enforce 
settlement. [0404-06; 0419-23; 0573-684.] Rather, the Knights imply this is a material term as 
a matter of law, stating that"[ w ]hile no Utah court has addressed whether a non-
disparagement clause is an essential term of a settlement agreement," the Seventh Circuit 
addressed this issue in Higbee v. Sentry Insurance Co., 253 F .3d 994 (7th Cir. 200 I), and held 
that a non-disparagement clause's parameters is an essential settlement term. [Id., at p. 18.] 
The Higbee decision, however, is of little help to the Knights because it does not stand for the 
blanket proposition that the Knights' claim, and its facts are very different from the facts here. 
The Seventh Circuit's Higbee opinion-far from making any sweeping 
pronouncements-stands merely for the unremarkable proposition that whether a term is an 
essential contract term depends on the specific facts of the case. See Higbee, 253 F .3d 994, at 
998.9 In fact, the Seventh Circuit expressly clarified the scope of its Higbee opinion in Dillard 
v. Starcon Int'! Inc., 483 F .3d 502 (7th Cir. 2007). In Dillard, the plaintiff claimed the parties 
had not reached a meeting of the minds on all of the essential terms of a settlement and were 
still negotiating numerous terms when negotiations broke off. Id., at 507. The magistrate 
judge was not persuaded and found the parties had reached a meeting of the minds on the 
essential terms of their agreement, and that the remaining terms being negotiated were not 
essential. Id., at 507-08. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the magistrate judge did 
9 The Seventh Circuit and Utah therefore appear to be in accord on this point because 
Utah law is well settled that whether a term is an essential contract term requires an 
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement 
was entered. Cessna Fin. Corp., 575 P.2d at 1050. 
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not abuse his discretion in finding that the parties had a meeting of the minds on all material 
8 terms essential to their settlement. Id. 
• 
In affirming the magistrate's decision, the Seventh Circuit clarified that its opinion in 
"Higbee does not stand for the proposition that [non-disparagement] provisions are material as 
a matter of law." Id., at 509. Rather, the court explained that these provisions were material in 
Higbee because "[t]he plaintiff in Higbee made clear during negotiations that she would not 
settle until the parties hammered out confidentiality and nondisparagement clauses [ and thus] 
[t]he materiality of these terms was never in doubt." Id., at 508-09. In Dixon, however, there 
was no evidence that the parameters of a non-disparagement clause were essential to the 
* parties' settlement, and the magistrate judge therefore did not err in enforcing the parties' 
settlement agreement. Id. 
Like the parties in Dixon, there is no evidence here that the Knights conditioned their 
agreement to settlement on first reaching agreement on the specific language and parameters 
of the mutual non-disparagement clause. And unlike the plaintiff in Higbee, the Knights never 
made clear during negotiations ( or at any other time) that they would not settle until the parties 
hammered out the specific parameters of a mutual non-disparagement provision. As discussed 
above, other than a conclusory, passing reference, the Knights never even mentioned the non-
disparagement issue to the trial court. And considering that the only reference in the record to 
the mutual non-disparagement provision is to the fact that the parties never specifically 
discussed its language reasonably indicates that the parties did not consider its language or 
parameters as being essential to their settlement. Based on the record in this case, there is no 
evidence that the specific language and parameters of a non-disparagement agreement were 
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essential to the parties' settlement, and the Knights have thus failed to carry their burden of 
demonstrating clear error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Patterson respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
ruling of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of June, 2016. 
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